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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers presenting or defending civil claims often terminate those
claims by settlements. Thus, one expects that "the controlling legal
principles" with respect to lawyer conduct for facilitating civil claim
settlements would be "quite settled." In Brewer v. National Railroad
Passenger Corporation' ("Brewer II"), a case involving the civil claim
settlement authority of a claimant's lawyer, the Supreme Court of
Illinois declared that the principles governing lawyer conduct in a civil
claim settlement were well settled in Illinois.2 Despite the Illinois
Supreme Court's declaration, however, the pre-Brewer H written laws
and judicial precedents were quite unsettled. In Brewer II, the Illinois
Supreme Court had a significant opportunity to settle much of this
confusion. The court not only missed the opportunity to clarify the
principles governing lawyer conduct, it also effectively added fuel to the
fire by obfuscating many critical issues that arise when lawyers engage
in settlement negotiations for their clients.
This Article will first examine Brewer H's failure to recognize the
unsettled nature of the "controlling legal principles." 3 Specifically, the
Brewer H court was unclear about the doctrine of express authority and
its burdens of proof. The court also failed to address the doctrine of
apparent authority, choice of law, and separation of powers issues. As a
result, current civil claim settlement authority guidelines for Illinois
lawyers are confusing and unsettled. Next, this Article will examine
familiar legal principles, including frequently overlooked standards in
the Illinois Professional Code,4 in order to clarify at least some of the
issues. Finally, this Article will propose ways to resolve the unsettling
questions about the civil claim settlement authority of lawyers under
Illinois law.
5
1. Brewer v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331 (Ill. 1995) [hereinafter Brewer
II], rev'g 628 N.E.2d 331 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993).
2- See id. at 1333.
3. See infra Part I (discussing the rules governing express authority, apparent authority and
burdens of proof).
4. See infra Part Ill (discussing relevant Illinois cases and the application of those authorities
to this and other similar situations).
5. See infra Part IV (discussing methods to remedy the confusion surrounding civil claim set-
tlements).
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II. THE "SETrLED" PRINCIPLES OF BREWER V. NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION
In Brewer H, the Illinois Supreme Court found "the controlling legal
principles... quite settled." 6 At issue in Brewer H was the scope of a
lawyer's settlement authority at a pretrial settlement conference.7 The
pretrial settlement agreement took place during an Illinois circuit court
proceeding involving the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA").
8
The FELA claim arose when Chester Brewer, a ten-year employee of
the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), fell at work,
injuring his head and lower back.9 The accident rendered Chester
unable to perform his previous responsibilities with Amtrak, although
he could return if he was assigned "lighter duties."'
10
A settlement conference before the trial judge included Chester's and
Amtrak's lawyers as well as an Amtrak "claims agent."" Although
Chester and his wife were in the courthouse during the negotiations,
they were not "in-chambers."' 12 The in-chambers talks led to an oral
agreement between the lawyers that included two forms of monetary
payments by Amtrak and the condition that Chester resign his position
with Amtrak. 13 Amtrak was to pay Chester $250,000, together with an
additional amount of up to $50,000 for medical expenses if Chester had
surgery within six months of the dismissal order in the case. 14 The
parties reached an agreement only after Chester's lawyer left the judge's
chambers to discuss the matter with Chester. 15 An order dismissing the
case with prejudice followed the agreement and the trial court entered
6. Brewer 11, 649 N.E.2d at 1333.
7. See id.
8. See Brewer v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 628 N.E.2d 331, 332 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1994) [hereinafter Brewer 1] (giving a detailed background on the cause of action, including an
explanation of the FELA), rev'd, 649 N.E.2d 1331 (I11. 1995).




13. See id. In ruling on Amtrak's motion to enforce the settlement and on Chester's motion to
vacate the dismissal order that was premised on the settlement agreement, "the trial judge specifi-
cally stated that he distinctly recalled the settlement conference and that plaintiff's resignation...
was raised several times during the negotiations ... [and] was a condition of the settlement offer
made by defense counsel to plaintiff's attorney." Id. at 334. The trial judge's statement suggests
that Chester's lawyer may have disputed the factual assertion that resignation was a condition of
the defendant's offer and would explain why he may never have talked to Chester about resigna-
tion.
14. See id. at 333.
15. See Brewer ll, 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1332 (Ill. 1995), rev'g 628 N.E.2d 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1993).
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the order after the trial judge personally spoke to the plaintiff.16  The
plaintiff and the judge, however, did not discuss the plaintiff's
resignation during their meeting. 17 Moreover, the dismissal order
"incorporated only defendant's agreement to pay plaintiff' and, thus, it
"did not incorporate an agreement that plaintiff would quit his job."'18
Furthermore, the order did not contain any provision retaining the
circuit court's jurisdiction. 19
One day after the dismissal order, Amtrak's claims agent mailed
releases to Chester based upon his understanding of the agreement with
Chester's lawyer.20 Chester, however, "refused to execute the releases
because he had not agreed to resign his position and wanted to keep the
option of attempting to return to work."-21 As a result, Amtrak filed a
motion to enforce the settlement offer.22 Subsequently, Chester filed a
motion to vacate the dismissal order. 23 Chester supported his motion to
vacate with affidavits from himself, his wife, and his attorney, who each
alleged "that plaintiff's resignation ... had not been contemplated as a
term of settlement and had not been accepted as part of the agreement
orally agreed to by counsel." 24
The "same trial court judge who had presided over the settlement
conference" granted Amtrak's motion and enforced the settlement
agreement.25  The judge found that the resignation issue "was raised
several times during the negotiations" and "was a condition of the
settlement offer made by defense counsel to plaintiffs attorney." 26 The
16. See id. at 1332-33. The Brewer H court remarked that "the judge did not remember spe-
cifically mentioning the resignation issue" when personally speaking to Chester prior to dismissal
of the case. Id. at 1333.
17. See id.
18. Id. In fact, the dismissal order expressly noted only the $50,000 payment, stating that the
court was "advised in the premises that all matters in controversy have been compromised and
settled" and that the $50,000 obligation was "part of the settlement." Brewer v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., No. 93-1454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Feb. 17, 1993) (dismissing case with preju-
dice).
19. See Brewer v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 93-1454 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Feb. 17,
1993).
20. See Brewer 1, 628 N.E.2d 331, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993), rev'd, 649 N.E.2d 1331
(Ill. 1995).
21. Id.
22. See Brewer II, 649 N.E.2d at 1333 (discussing Amtrak's motion to enforce settlement).
23. See id. This motion was deemed timely under Illinois law. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-1203(a) (West 1998) (allowing a party to file a motion to vacate a judgment within 30 days
after entry of the judgment).
24. Brewer 1, 628 N.E.2d at 333.
25. Id. at 333-34.
26. Id. at 334.
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judge further found that the plaintiff's lawyer only accepted the offer
"after leaving the chambers to confer with his client.-
27
The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's enforcement
of the settlement agreement. 28 The appellate court first noted that the
trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, even though the
case had been dismissed with prejudice, because the plaintiff, Chester,
opened a post-judgment proceeding by submitting a motion to vacate
the initial dismissal order. 29 Then, the appellate court declared that the
agreement was enforceable because the plaintiff could be bound by his
lawyer's statements regarding an agreement, "particularly where the
settlement was made in open court or in the presence of the client,"
even if the plaintiff misunderstood or mistook the terms of the
agreement.30
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's
enforcement of the settlement agreement.31 The Illinois Supreme Court
recognized the trial court's jurisdiction to enforce the agreement's
alleged resignation provision because trial courts have "the power to
enforce a settlement agreement entered into by the parties while the suit
is pending before the court. ' 32  Next, however, the Illinois Supreme
Court found that "the controlling legal principles," which were "quite
settled" in Illinois, supported the conclusion that the settlement could
not be enforced.33 Specifically, the court recognized the "settled" legal
principle that a lawyer may not settle a civil claim without "the client's
27. Id.
28. See id. at 335.
29. See id. at 334. However, the appellate court did not explain how the trial court had juris-
diction over the enforcement of a contract term not incorporated into a court order. The omission
of the resignation agreement from the court order may have placed the issue of enforceability out-
side of the court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381
(1994) (stating that jurisdiction to enforce dismissal-producing settlement agreement exists only
where court order embodies agreement or at least retains authority over the agreement); American
Soc. of Lub. Eng. v. Roetheli, 621 N.E.2d 30, 34 (11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993) (explaining that
where jurisdiction is not retained "for the precise purpose of enforcing the settlement," plaintiff
may need to file a separate lawsuit for breach of contract remedy). Jurisdictional issues could
have been avoided if Amtrak's motion had been analyzed under 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-
1203(a) and characterized as a request to modify the initial dismissal order to contain the resigna-
tion duty and the retention of authority to enforce the new order. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-
1203(a) (West 1998) (allowing a court to retain jurisdiction if a party moves for modification of
the judgment within 30 days of the entry of the judgment).
30. Brewer 1, 628 N.E.2d at 334-35.
31. See Brewer 11, 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1333 (Ill. 1995), rev'g 628 N.E.2d 331 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1993).
32. Id. at 1333.
33. Id. at 1333-34.
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express authorization .to do so." 34  Therefore, because Chester's
affidavits in support of his motion to vacate35 provided "affirmative
evidence" that Chester's lawyer did not have the necessary "express
authorization" to agree that Chester would quit his job as part of the
settlement agreement, the court invalidated the civil claim settlement.36
The court found support for this "settled" legal principle in two turn-
of-the-century Illinois Supreme Court precedents 37 as well as in a
dissenting supreme court opinion issued a few years before Brewer J.38
These prior decisions, however, say little about when and how such
express authority may be given. One court suggested that even where
there is express authorization, a settlement by a lawyer on behalf of a
client may be invalidated on the basis of "bad faith. 3 9 Furthermore, a
civil claim settlement otherwise invalid due to a lawyer's lack of
express authority may become valid if ratified by the lawyer's client.40
A second "settled" principle underlying Brewer II involved the
burden of proof with respect to the issue of express authorization.
Normally, when settlement talks occur outside the court, the party
34. Id. at 1334. The Brewer I court stated that "[an attorney who represents a client in liti-
gation has no authority to compromise, consent to a judgment against the client, or give up or
waive any right of the client. Rather, the attorney must receive the client's express authorization
to do so." Id. This differs significantly from the general rule in criminal case settlements where
such authorization is not necessary. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.2(a) ("In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after disclosure by the
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.");
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 402 (compliance with several notice and hearing requirements personally in-
volving the criminal defendant are required before pleas of guilty may be entered).
35. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (describing the affidavits submitted to support
Chester's motion to vacate).
36. See Brewer 11, 649 N.E.2d at 1334.
37. See Danziger v. Pittsfield Shoe Co., 68 N.E. 534 (Iil. 1903) (holding that an attorney can-
not settle a case out-of-court without "special authority"); McClintock v. Helberg, 48 N.E. 145
(I11. 1897) (deciding that the acceptance of payment purporting to be a settlement amount by an
attorney is not actually a settlement without the express authority of the client).
38. See Colvin v. Hobart Bros., 620 N.E.2d 375 (Ill. 1993) (Harrison, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a party's assertion that it did not receive all of the facts before settlement constituted a lack of
express authority and would support a summary judgment motion overturning the settlement).
39. See McClintock, 48 N.E. at 148. The McClintock court stated, "It is a well-settled rule that
agreements by an attorney, which are so unreasonable as to imply bad faith, will operate as notice
of such bad faith to the opposite side, and will have no binding effect upon the client." Id.
40. See Danziger, 68 N.E. at 536 (concluding that an agreement by a lawyer may bind the cli-
ent where there is proof of "acquiescence on the part of the client after knowledge of the facts");
McClintock, 48 N.E. at 148 (stating that upon an agreement by an opposing party's lawyer, a
"duty to inquire" arises as to "whether or not [the agreement was] ratified and accepted" by the
opposing party).
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alleging authority bears the burden of proving actual authority.41 Thus,
an attorney facing a settlement initiative or response from an opposing
attorney has the responsibility "to make inquiry or to demand proof of
the attorney's authority. . ". ."42 The burden shifts when settlement talks
occur in "open court" because in that context "the existence of the
attorney of record's authority to settle ... is presumed unless rebutted
by affirmative evidence that authority is lacking."
43
The principle regarding the burden of proof when settlement talks
occur in "open court," however, is not so settled. Indeed, the Illinois
Supreme Court has only recognized this open court presumption in dicta
without reference to earlier case law or to other legal authority. In
Brooks v. Kearns,44 decided in 1877, the court stated: "[h]ad the
agreement been made a part of the decree of court.., presumptions
would be indulged as to the authority of the solicitors in the premises;
but this is an agreement made out of court .... 4 This dicta, however,
fails to explain why agreements in open court might be handled
differently than agreements outside of court. The Illinois Court of
Appeals recognized the presumption of express authority, but this
recognition is also quite general and seems to be little more than dicta.
46
In its support of the presumption of express authority, the appellate
court utilized two federal court decisions: the first involved an out-of-
41. See Brewer IH, 649 N.E.2d at 1334 (citing Danziger, 68 N.E. at 536) (stating that "the
party alleging the existence of authority to bind principals takes upon himself the burden of
proving that fact").
42. Id. (citing McClintock, 48 N.E. at 148) (recognizing that when the opposing attorney of-
fers settlement, the "opposite party... is put upon inquiry as to the attorney's authority... and,
if he omits to make inquiry, or to demand the production of the authority, he deals with the attor-
ney at his peril"). Both the Brewer II and McClintock opinions assume that upon inquiry or de-
mand of proof, an opposing lawyer will reveal information as to express authorization. Yet such
authorization may reasonably be viewed by some lawyers as part of confidential attorney-client
communications that an attorney may not reveal without client consent. See, e.g., ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 370 (1993) ("A lawyer should not, absent
informed client consent, reveal to a judge the limits of the lawyer's settlement authority or the
lawyer's advice to the client regarding settlement.").
43. Brewer 1, 649 N.E.2d at 1334. The Brewer I court found support for this presumption in
a very early high court precedent as well as in a decade-old intermediate appellate court decision.
See Brooks v. Kearns, 86 I1. 547, 551 (1877) (suggesting that an attorney has authority to settle
matters discussed in open court); Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 432 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1982) (recognizing a presumption of express authority when settlements appear in
open court).
44. Brooks v. Kearns, 86 I1. 547 (1877).
45. Id. at 551.
46. See Szymkowski, 432 N.E.2d at 1211. In Szymkowski, the recognition of the presumption
of express authority appeared to be dicta based on significant evidence of express authorization,
the lawyer's "apparent authority," and post-agreement ratification by the client. See id.
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court settlement and a very different presumption under federal law,
47
and the other case involved either implied authority or ratification.
48
Finally, the appellate court relied on an Illinois high court decision that
simply recognized, but did not employ, the dicta remarks of the Illinois
Supreme Court.
49
After applying these "settled" legal principles to the facts and
concluding that there was no express authorization for Chester's lawyer
to agree to Chester's resignation from employment, the Brewer IH court
then referenced three additional intermediate appellate court decisions
issued in the last decade. 50  These decisions affirmed, but without
significant analysis, the need for an individual client's express
authorization of lawyer settlement power and for differing burdens of
proof for in court and out of court lawyer agreements. Like the court in
Brewer II, the applicable law in these decisions was viewed as clearly
settled.51  These decisions added to the legal analysis, in ways
comparable to some of the other cases cited in Brewer II, by extending
the discussion of lawyer settlement authority to issues beyond express
individual client authorization and burden of proof.
47. See Bradford Exch. v. Trein's Exch., 600 F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1979). In Bradford Ex-
change, which involved an alleged trademark violation, the court made no reference to state law.
See id. Rather, the court employed several federal precedents to hold that "an attorney of record
is presumed to have his client's authority to compromise and settle litigation" out-of-court,
though the presumption may be rebutted. Id. The court noted that the injunction agreed to was
"so onerous and costly that it is dubious whether Trein's would have given their attorneys
authority to stipulate" to it and, therefore, held that the presumption was rebutted. Id.
48. See United States v. Kenner, 455 F.2d 1, 4-5 (7th Cir. 1972). The Kenner court made no
reference to state law in a case involving a person's federal tax liabilities. See id. The court
found that a person's attorneys had "implied authority" to consent to a court order because the
person retained the attorneys for fifteen months following the order, and challenged the order
three years later. See id. The Kenner court further reasoned that "the government without the
consent of the attorneys was entitled to summary judgment" on the matters contained in the
agreed order. id.
49. See Danziger v. Pittsfield Shoe Co., 68 N.E. 534, 535-36 (111. 1903) (recognizing the ne-
cessity of express authority to settle a case, but instead implying that the settlement amount was
simply a payment on an account, and thereby not a settlement at all).
50. See Brewer M1, 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1334 (Ill. 1995) (citing Kazale v. Kar-Lee Flowers, 541
N.E.2d 219 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989)), rev'g 628 N.E.2d 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993);
Knisely v. City of Jacksonville, 497 N.E.2d 883 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1986); County of Cook v.
Patka, 405 N.E.2d 1376 (1l. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1980)).
51. See Knisely, 497 N.E.2d at 886. The Knisely court noted that "[tihe general rules con-
cerning settlements are well-known .... The law is clear that an attorney may bind his client to a
settlement agreement .... However .... [the attorney] must receive express consent or authori-
zation... [but] the existence of the attorney of record's authority to settle in open court is pre-
sumed unless rebutted .... Id.; see also Parka, 405 N.E.2d at 1380 ("[Ilt is firmly established in
Illinois that an attorney employed to represent his client in litigation has no authority to compro-
mise ... without the express consent or authorization of that client.").
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In Knisely v. City of Jacksonville,52 for instance, the court recognized
the possible applicability of the doctrine of "apparent authority," which
would allow a lawyer to bind a client to a civil claim settlement without
any actual or presumed express authorization. 53 The Knisely court
specifically stated: "[w]here a party silently stands by and permits his
attorney to act in his behalf in dealing with another in a situation where
the attorney may be presumed to have authority, the party is estopped
from denying the agent's apparent authority as to third persons."54 This
language comes from Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 5 which itself relied
on Kalman v. Bertacchi.
56
In Kalman, the court applied the apparent authority doctrine to bind
two codefendants to a settlement that a third defendant made in open
court in their absence and without express authorization delegated either
to the defendants' lawyer or to the third defendant.57 The Kalman court
determined that apparent authority was applicable because "events and
actions... would reasonably lead an ordinarily prudent person to
believe" the third defendant "was acting on behalf of all the
defendants."
58
The doctrine of apparent authority employed in Kalman has been
used in settings where the apparent agent is an Illinois civil claimant's
or civil defendant's lawyer, rather than a co-party. Specifically, in
Sakun v. Taffer,59 a lawyer's signature on behalf of two civil defendants
bound the defendants to a settlement agreement, even though the
defendants did not expressly agree to the settlement terms and were
unaware of them.6° The Sakun court determined that apparent authority
operated as a "logical implied extension" of the lawyer's express
authority to enter into and carry on settlement negotiations. 6 1 The court
further determined that this authority lasted for approximately one year,
during which time the lawyer had "continually apprised" the defendants
52. Knisley v. City of Jacksonville, 497 N.E.2d 883 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1986).
53. See id. at 886. The court cited Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 432 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1982), to support the applicability of the doctrine of apparent authority.
54. Knisley, 497 N.E.2d at 886. In Knisely, the doctrine of apparent authority was clearly in-
applicable to the alleged settlement agreement and the defendant did not argue it as a basis for
enforcing the agreement. See id. Furthermore, Knisely involved a settlement agreed to by most,
but not all, of the 61 plaintiffs who joined in the lawsuit. See id.
55. Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 432 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1982).
56. Kalman v. Bertacchi, 373 N.E.2d 550 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1978).
57. See id. at 556.
58. Id.
59. Sakun v. Taffer, 643 N.E.2d 1271 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994).
60. See id. at 1276-78.
61. See id. at 1278.
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and the trial judge of what was happening. 62 Moreover, the court held
that the settlement authority of the lawyer could be "presumed" from
the defendant's silence and other conduct during the negotiations, at
least where plaintiffs and their lawyer could have reasonably believed
that the "scope of authority" of the defendant's lawyer included
settlement authority.6 3
Additionally, in County of Cook v. Patka,64 the court placed a special
or different application of the express authorization rule in cases
involving state or municipal bodies. 65 The court stated that "the rule is
especially applicable when a person seeks to establish a waiver against a
municipal body since estoppel against public bodies is not favored...
and a governmental body cannot be estopped by an act of its agent
which exceeds the authority conferred on him.' 66  Thus, anyone
"dealing with a governmental body takes the risk of accurately
ascertaining" the authority of governmental agents, even where the
agents are personally unaware of their own limitations.
67
I. UNSETTLING QUESTIONS AFTER BREWER V. NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION
As with many of its predecessors, Brewer II finds the prevailing laws
involving the authority of Illinois lawyers to settle their clients' civil
claims embodied within a few "quite settled" principles. 68 Upon closer
examination of the decision-the precedents it employs and the
precedents and other laws it fails to mention-several unsettling
questions arise about the so-called "settled" legal principles governing
the settlement of civil cases.69 Accordingly, this Article will focus on
the legal principles actually explored in Brewer II, and will then
examine other legal principles on lawyer settlement authority
unaddressed in Brewer II where, in at least some instances, exploration
would have been useful and perhaps determinative. 70  Finally, it will
62. See i&.
63. See id. at 1277.
64. County of Cook v. Patka, 405 N.E.2d 1376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1980) (holding that the
assistant state's attorney was not authorized to waive the county's right to a demolition lien).
65. See id. at 1380-81.
66. Id. at 1380.
67. Id. at 1380-81.
68. See Brewer 11, 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1333 (Ill. 1995), rev'g 628 N.E.2d 331 (111. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1993).
69. See supra Part II (discussing the "settled" legal principles of Brewer II).
70. See, e.g., People v. Pecor, 606 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (111. 1992) (stating that the reviewing
court's responsibilities of finding a just result and maintaining a sound body of precedent can
override the consideration of waiver that arises from an adversarial legal system).
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note a few important issues implicated in Brewer Ii relating to civil
claim settlements, but not to lawyer settlement authority.
71
A. Unsettling Questions About Quite Settled Principles
The first "settled" principle in Brewer H involved the need for "the
client's express authorization" of any civil claim settlement.72
Unfortunately, the nature of both the required expression and the
authorization remain unclear.
As to expression, the court in Brewer H was unclear whether a valid
settlement required Chester to have "expressly" authorized his lawyer to
agree that he "would quit his job," given that resignation was neither
mentioned in the trial court dismissal order nor in the trial judge's
conversation with Chester before the dismissal.73 The Brewer II court
did not discuss why it viewed resignation as so important to Chester,
given that he was also receiving at least a quarter of a million dollars
74
and that he could never resume his old job duties. Perhaps, though not
likely, the Brewer II court meant to require that every party "expressly"
agree to every term of any agreement worked out by the lawyers before
it can be effective. If this was not the court's intention, then it failed to
provide any guidance as to what settlement terms do require "express
authorization." If, by contrast, the Brewer H court meant the client only
must "expressly" authorize lawyer settlement authority even if it is in
advance of any settlement talks, it again failed to provide guidance.
75
While it seems that Chester may not have discussed resignation with his
lawyer, the case does not reveal what Chester did say to his lawyer and
what the lawyer said to Chester.
With respect to which contractual terms of lawyer negotiated
tentative agreements that civil litigants must "expressly" accept, the
Brewer II court could have been guided by the "bad faith" analysis,
which suggests that "unreasonable" terms require express party
71. See infra Part Il.C (discussing other unsettling questions relating to civil claim settle-
ments).
72. Brewer 11, 649 N.E.2d at 1333-34.
73. Id. at 1334.
74. See id. at 1332 (stating that under the agreement, an additional $50,000 would be paid if
Chester underwent back surgery within six months of case dismissal).
75. Compare Tiernan v. DeVoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1033 (3d Cir. 1991) (using Pennsylvania law,
finding that express authority "must be the result of explicit instructions regarding settlement"),
with Smedly v. Temple Drilling Co., 782 F.2d 1357, 1360 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that "it is per-
missible for a client to give its lawyer general authority to settle cases").
2000]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
consent.76 In other words, the Brewer H court could have distinguished
between settlement issues that are so important that lawyers must
"expressly" discuss them with their clients and settlement issues that
clients may expressly or implicitly leave to their lawyers.
As to authorization, the "bad faith" analysis reveals another
shortcoming of Brewer H as a general guide to Illinois lawyers. Brewer
I is silent regarding the possible timing of express client authorizations,
except after lawyers have reached a tentative pact. Indeed, the Brewer
H court did not resolve whether lawyers can receive some forms of
express authorization to settle before scheduling a particular pretrial
settlement conference, or prior to engaging in a scheduled out-of-court
settlement talk with opposing counsel. Additionally, the court left open
the question of whether a client may grant some express authorizations
during a civil case for all future settlement discussions wherever they
occur. Moreover, the court failed to address whether some forms of
express authorization to settle an accrued claim may be granted to a
lawyer upon retainer, prior to the commencement of any legal work or
lawsuit. Finally, the Brewer H court never answered whether some
forms of express authorization of lawyer settlement power involve at
least partial settlements of future civil claims, as opposed to accrued
civil claims, on such matters as compulsory arbitration or liquidated
damages.
Thus, the most unsettling questions about client authorization of
lawyer settlement power include issues of how and when clients may
communicate settlement authorization to lawyers and whether there is
any limitation on the scope of this authorization. The judicial
precedents relied upon in Brewer H, and their respective rationales,
raise other troubling questions about authorization. Specifically,
questions arise as to whether there should be different settlement
authorization guidelines for different civil litigants.77 Furthermore,
questions arise as to who, besides lawyers, may be authorized to settle a
person's or a party's claim.
78
76. See McClintock v. Helberg, 48 N.E. 145, 148 (I11. 1897) (holding that where an agreement
by a lawyer is so "unreasonable" for her client, it has "no binding effect upon the client" because
the adverse party has notice of the lawyer's "bad faith").
77. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of apparent authority).
In County of Cook v. Patka, 405 N.E.2d 1376, 1380-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1980), for instance,
the court held that it is generally more difficult for governmental agents to bind their principals
than it is for other agents.
78. See Kalman v. Bertacchi, 373 N.E.2d 550, 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1978). Kalman was
the basis for the holding in Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, which the Brewer H court utilized. See
Brewer I, 649 N.E.2d at 1334. In Kalman, one defendant was found to have been authorized to
settle claims pending against two codefendants. See Kalman, 373 N.E.2d at 556. In Brewer H
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The second "settled" principle in Brewer II involved distinctions
between settlements in "open court" and settlements "out-of-court" for
burden of proof purposes. Neither Brewer I nor its cited precedents
fully discuss the rationales underlying this distinction. Thus, there is
scant guidance on what constitutes "open court" settlements. Indeed, it
is unclear from Brewer H whether "open court" means that the public
can sit in on the proceedings, or whether "open court" proceedings, at
least in this setting, include off-the-record, in-chambers settlement
conferences presided over by the trial judge.
79
In Brewer II, there may have been both types of proceedings, as there
were at least settlement discussions in the judge's chambers and later
settlement discussions in the courtroom. 80 Seemingly, in Brewer II the
relevant settlement proceedings were limited to those occurring in the
trial judge's chambers in the absence of Chester because the resignation
issue arose only during those discussions. 8' In Brooks v. Kearns, the
only high court case cited in Brewer I on the "open court" presumption
of lawyer authority, 82 however, the Illinois Supreme Court only spoke
of indulging a presumption for an agreement "made a part of the decree
of court. '83 Furthermore, in Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, the court
attached the "open court" presumption to a lawyer negotiated settlement
where the settlement terms were "announced to the court" in a
proceeding at which the client was present and sat silently as the terms
were discussed and recounted. 84
B. Unsettling Questions on Other Issues of
Lawyer Settlement Authority
Beyond the legal principles involving express authorization and open
court proceedings, the Brewer H court failed to explore several other
itself, Amtrak appeared to authorize a "claims agent," rather than (or together with) its lawyer, to
settle a pending claim. See Brewer 11, 649 N.E.2d at 1332.
79. Outside of Illinois, "in court" proceedings for presumptive lawyer settlement authority
purposes may even include proceedings that do not involve trial court judges. See, e.g., Miller v.
Ryan, 706 N.E.2d 244, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that a medical review panel meeting is
an in court proceeding because the presiding official is a statutorily-approved panel chairperson
and the meeting is required by disputing parties).
80. See Brewer 1H, 649 N.E.2d at 1332-33. After hearing these settlement discussions and
speaking to Chester personally, the trial judge entered a dismissal order. See id.
81. See id. at 1333 (noting that the trial judge did not remember specifically mentioning the
resignation issue when he personally spoke to Chester).
82. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing how a civil claim settlement can be
valid if the client ratifies it, notwithstanding his attorney's lack of express authority).
83. Brooks v. Kearns, 86 Ill. 547, 551 (1877).
84. Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 432 N.E.2d 1209, 1210-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1982).
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significant legal issues relating to lawyer settlement authority,85 such as
the doctrine of apparent authority, choice of law, and separation of
powers. First, the doctrine of apparent authority can be confusing
because it is occasionally described as a form of express authorization,
which usually involves acts between the attorney and client.86 The
doctrine of apparent authority involves the ways in which the conduct of
a party might reasonably appear to authorize a lawyer to settle, whether
or not that party has, in fact, delegated express authority. 87
Arguably, in Brewer II, Chester's conduct reasonably appeared to
Amtrak to authorize Chester's lawyer to settle on Chester's behalf.
Chester was in the courthouse on the day his lawyer agreed to Chester's
resignation, a fact known to Amtrak as well as to the trial court judge.
In addition, Chester appeared to meet with his lawyer immediately
before the parties reached the agreement on resignation.
88
Brewer H also failed to explore the issue of choice of law. The
gravamen of Chester's claim rested on FELA,89 a federal statute that
requires "uniformity in adjudication" such that state courts hearing
FELA claims may not employ "strict" local civil procedure laws to
defeat federally created rights.90 Regarding the resolution of disputes
over releases of FELA claims, the United States Supreme Court wrote:
We agree ... that validity of releases under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act raises a federal question to be determined by federal
85. Legal issues not raised by any party on appeal, but for which there is a complete factual
record, can be utilized to affirm a lower court decision. See Brooks v. Brennan, 625 N.E.2d 1188,
1193 (ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1994). "Indeed, a court of review is free to affirm the lower court on
any grounds called for in the record, regardless of the reasoning or grounds relied upon by the
lower court." Id.
86. See, e.g., Sakun v. Taffer, 643 N.E.2d 1271, 1278 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994) (finding a
lawyer's authority to enter settlement negotiations and to carry them on for almost a year while
giving the trial court and his client notice of what was occurring logically "implied" the extension
of this authority to full settlement power); Bradford v. Denny's Inc., No. 97C1531, 1998 WL
312009, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 1998) (citing Sakun, 643 N.E.2d at 1278). The Bradford court
confused the concept of implied actual authority with the doctrine of apparent authority. See
Bradford, 1998 WL 312009, at *4.
87. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 (Tentative
Draft No. 5, March 29, 1996).
88. See Brewer II, 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1332 (Ill. 1995), rev'g 628 N.E.2d 331 (il1. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1993); see also Sakun, 643 N.E.2d at 1278 (holding that a lawyer had apparent authority to
settle because he engaged in several settlement negotiations about which he informed both his
client and the court).
89. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
90. See Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949). Outside of FELA
claims, the same standard is often applied when federal law causes of action are in state courts.
See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (discussing civil rights claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
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rather than state law .... State laws are not controlling in determining
what the incidents of this federal right shall be .... Manifestly the
federal rights... could be defeated if states were permitted to have the
final say as to what defenses could and could not be properly
interposed to suits under the Act. Moreover, only if federal law
controls can the federal Act be given that uniform application
throughout the country essential to effectuate its 'purposes ....
Releases and other devices designed to liquidate or defeat injured
employees' claims play an important part in the federal Act's
administration .... Their validity is but one of the many interrelated
questions that must constantly be determined in these cases according
to a uniform federal law.9 1
Yet the Brewer H court did not explain why federal law principles were
not relevant when determining whether the actions by Chester's lawyer
liquidated the FELA claim.
92
Finally, Brewer H neglects to examine the issue of separation of
powers. Specifically, the court assumed the applicability of Illinois law
to any lawyer settlement authority questions and failed to discuss the
intrastate allocation of lawmaking responsibilities. Both the General
Assembly and the courts share lawmaking duties and exercise
concurrent powers at times with some exclusive judicial powers in
limited settings.93 Lawyer conduct that facilitates a client's civil claim
settlement may be addressed by civil procedure lawmaking, 94 by lawyer
91. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1952) (citations
omitted). While the alleged release in Dice preceded the filing of the lawsuit and the alleged re-
lease in Brewer 11 came after the civil action was commenced, the rationales employed in Dice
arguably fit both settings.
92. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A) (1994) (wavier by an individual of a federal Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act claim must be in a written "agreement between the individual and the
employer").
93. Exclusive high court authority most likely arises with issues significantly implicating the
regulation of the legal (judges and lawyers) profession. See, e.g., Cripe v. Leiter, 703 N.E.2d
100, 105 (Ill. 1998) (stating that Illinois rules governing attorney conduct have historically been
recognized as within the inherent and exclusive authority of the high court). For a discussion of
the general division of lawmaking responsibilities relating to court procedures and the legal pro-
fession, see Jeffrey A. Parness & Bruce Keller, Increased and Accessible Illinois Judicial Rule-
making, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 817 (1988).
94. This occurs when the General Assembly and the Illinois courts, via both rulemaking and
procedural common law decision making, each have significant responsibilities with regard to
lawyer conduct.
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professional conduct lawmaking,95 and by substantive contract
lawmaking.
96
On the legal questions raised in Brewer II, any of these varying forms
of lawmaking might be relevant. Civil procedure laws govern many
aspects of civil case proceedings in the Illinois circuit courts, including
some matters relating to settlement conferences overseen by circuit
judges.97 Professional conduct laws for lawyers govern many aspects of
the legal representation of clients with pending civil claims.
98
Additionally, substantive contract laws generally govern many aspects
of agency-principal relationships and capacity to submit to binding
agreements.
99
The nature of the common law precedents on the two legal principles
actually explored in Brewer H is somewhat unclear. "Express
authorization" to settle suggests a substantive contract law matter;
however, the "burden of proof' sounds like a civil procedure law
matter. Yet with both principles there is a strong inclination to say that
most guidelines on lawyer authority to act for clients be embodied
within professional conduct laws. The Illinois Professional Conduct
Rule 1.2(a), which generally holds that a lawyer shall abide by a client's
decision regarding a civil claim settlement, however, is mentioned
neither in Brewer nor in any of the judicial precedents it employs.
C. Other Unsettling Questions Relating to Civil Claim Settlements
Beyond the examined principles and unexplored issues relating to
lawyer civil claim settlement authority, Brewer H raises further
important questions about civil claim settlement laws, unrelated to
lawyer settlement authority, which involve required writings.
Specifically, the court failed to answer when civil claim settlement pacts
must be in writing in order to be effective and when oral agreements
may be binding. In Brewer H, the court did not require a writing as to
95. This occurs when the Illinois Supreme Court asserts exclusive authority over lawyer con-
duct.
96. This occurs when the General Assembly has the most significant powers over lawyer con-
duct. The General Assembly's work, however, may be supplemented by the substantive common
law decision making of the courts.
97. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218 (discussing pretrial procedure).
98. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1993) (client's decision to
accept a civil claim settlement offer); Rule 1.6(a) (maintenance of client's confidences or secrets)
and 1.7 (general rule on conflicts of interest barring representation).
99. See Advance Mortg. Corp. v. Concordia Mut. Life Ass'n, 481 N.E.2d 1025, 1029 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1985) (concluding that express contract can create agent-principal relationship
from which agent may bind principal under notions of actual authority, apparent authority, or in-
herent power).
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Chester's resignation, even though the matter of resignation was not
explicitly addressed in the trial court dismissal order. 100 Therefore, it is
unclear as to whether a writing was unnecessary in Brewer II. The
traditional Statute of Frauds mandates do not include contracts, such as
the alleged pact between Chester and Amtrak, which parties can
perform within a year. 0 1 The court failed to address, however, whether
the traditional Statute of Frauds dictates are applicable, or applicable in
different ways, to civil claim settlement agreements. 1
02
Other questions on civil claim settlement laws involve judicial
discretion to order those with ultimate settlement authority in civil cases
to attend pretrial conferences that will, or may, involve settlement
discussions or negotiations. In Brewer H, the trial court judge presided
over settlement negotiations between the attorneys for plaintiff and
defendant. 10 3  An Amtrak claims agent attended these settlement
negotiations; however, Chester and his wife were not present but were
in the courthouse at the time. 104
At the time of Brewer H, the Illinois Supreme Court rule on pretrial
procedure explicitly recognized that in addition to "counsel familiar
with the case and authorized to act," the court could direct "the parties"
to appear at the initial case management conference. 10 5 The rule,
however, did not expressly recognize that settlement "shall be
considered" at the conference. 1 6 Several months after Brewer H, the
rule was amended to delete the court's expressly-recognized authority to
direct party appearance, but also to add that "the possibility of
settlement" shall be considered at the initial conference. 1°7 Thus, in
Brewer H, it is unclear why the court did not require Chester to attend
the conference given that his presence seemingly would have
eliminated, or at least dramatically reduced, the prospect of later
100. See Brewer!!, 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1335 (Ill. 1995), rev'g 628 N.E.2d 331 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1993).
101. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1 (West 1998). "No action shall be brought.., upon any
agreement that is not to be performed with the space of one year from the making thereof,...
unless the promise shall be in writing." Id.
102. See Kalman v. Bertacchi, 373 N.E.2d 550, 556 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1978) (stating that
"[iut is not the intention of the Statute of Frauds to affect stipulations made in a court and subject
to the court's supervision and control").
103. See Brewer II, 649 N.E.2d at 1332.
104. See id.
105. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218 (amended 1995).
106. See id.
107. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218 (amended 1995); see also CHL DAILY L. BULL., June 2, 1995, at 5-
6 (containing both the old and the new proposed versions of Rule 218, which were actually
adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in 166 Il.2d I, cvii).
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confusion over settlement terms. Further, it is unclear why, given
Chester's absence, the court placed the fault on Amtrak for failing "to
make inquiry or to demand proof' of Chester's lawyer's authority,
10 8
rather than holding Chester's lawyer responsible for exercising
authority not delegated to him.
10 9
Other questions from Brewer H involve the prerequisites for judicial
enforcement of civil claim settlements. Generally, trial courts may, but
need not, be available to enforce terms of civil claim settlement
agreements when alleged breaches occur.11° Thus, for instance, the
United States Supreme Court has said that federal district courts have
ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement resulting from
an order of voluntary dismissal "either by separate provision, such as a
provision 'retaining jurisdiction' over the settlement agreement or by
incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order."ll'
In Brewer H, the Illinois Supreme Court found that "the trial court
retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement."' 12  The
portion of the agreement Amtrak sought to enforce, the alleged job
resignation by Chester, was not incorporated into the trial court order.
Furthermore, there was no express provision retaining subject matter
jurisdiction in the trial court order. Nevertheless, in Brewer H the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court retained enforcement
jurisdiction because the suit was pending, insofar as Chester had moved
to vacate the dismissal order. 113 The trial court retained jurisdiction
over that case for thirty days after the final order of judgment.
114
Clarification of the prerequisites to judicial enforcement of civil claim
settlement pacts are especially important in Illinois because there is
often no calendar system wherein a single judge hears all aspects of a
certain case. Moreover, often many months pass between the time of a
settlement agreement and the time of attempted enforcement, thereby
making the availability of the same judge in both settings unlikely.
Thus, the trial judge involved in the attempted enforcement of a civil
108. Brewer I1, 649 N.E.2d at 1334 (citing McClintock v. Helberg, 48 N.E. 145 (Ill. 1897)).
109. See Sakun v. Taffer, 643 N.E.2d 1271, 1279 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994). Though de-
fendants are bound by a settlement with plaintiffs entered into by defendants' lawyer with appar-
ent (but no actual) authority, defendants may have cause of action against their lawyer. See id.
110. See Brewer I, 649 N.E.2d at 1333 (stating that the trial court has the power to enforce
the settlement agreement).
111. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (deciding that the court
may make compliance with the settlement part of its order).
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claim settlement often has no independent recollection or knowledge of
the original settlement agreement's terms.
IV. BETTER CIVIL CLAIM SETTLEMENT PRINCIPLES
FOR ILLINOIS LAWYERS
Illinois needs to establish better civil claim settlement principles for
lawyers. The pursuit of this objective would be best accomplished by
undertaking a comprehensive lawmaking initiative in Illinois that
examines issues relating to the civil claim settlement authority of
lawyers. The agenda should include not only the principles involving
express authorization and burden of proof, which Brewer H actually
explored, but also the issues of apparent authority and choice of law,
which Brewer H failed to examine. A more ambitious lawmaking
initiative worthy of consideration, though not strongly suggested by
Brewer H, would also include other matters relating to civil claim
settlement laws, including required writings, judicial discretion
regarding attendance or availability at case management conferences,
and judicial enforcement.
A. Comprehensive Lawmaking
Comprehensive lawmaking, at least on matters of lawyer civil claim
settlement authority, may be pursued in a variety of ways. First, in
deciding a pending case and, perhaps, even when determining whether
to accept review in a case, the Illinois Supreme Court should clarify the
unsettling legal principles related to attorney civil claim settlement
authority. This "common law" approach, that the Illinois Supreme
Court uses, is not without persuasive authority; the Indiana Supreme
Court recently employed it in Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc.,115 a case
involving a certified question on Indiana civil claim settlement law
came from a federal district court. 116 This approach, however, has
significant drawbacks. In particular, it may not provide all who are
interested in discussing or debating the issues with sufficient
opportunity to do so. 117 Furthermore, the facts of the relevant case may
115. Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. 1998).
116. See id. at 1301. In Koval, the issue was whether a "settlement [is] binding between third
parties and the client" when "an attorney settles a claim as to which the attorney has been re-
tained, but does so without the client's consent." Id.
117. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 775-79 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(reviewing the benefits of public hearings for administrative agency rulemaking when new stan-
dards are developed).
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constrain the court from a full consideration of all important matters;
1 8
thus, the case results would not be integrated into the relevant written
laws such as the rules of civil procedure and the rules of lawyer or
judicial conduct, creating the potential that they escape much of the
attention that they require. 119
The pursuit of comprehensive lawmaking, at least on matters of
lawyer civil claim settlement authority, would be best accomplished
through coordinated judicial rulemaking proceedings. These
proceedings should involve the Illinois Supreme Court committees that
advise on possible amendments to the civil procedure rules, the lawyer
professional conduct rules, and the judicial conduct rules.120 Under this
method of revision, access and the opportunity to be heard are usually
assured, 12 1 deliberations are not constrained by the limited facts of any
case, and the results would be easily discovered.
B. More Settled Principles
Without prejudging the results of any comprehensive, and hopefully
robust, debate about civil claim settlement laws, it is worthwhile to
consider a few additional thoughts on the major principles and issues
emanating from Brewer I.
1. Actual Authority
The phrase "express authorization" as used in Brewer II should be
recharacterized as "actual authorization," under which a party in a civil
action could either expressly or implicitly authorize her lawyer to settle.
Express authorization embodies language and/or conduct directed by
the party to her lawyer clearly indicating the party's intent that the
lawyer strike a certain deal or negotiate the best available deal, where
there may or may not be maximum/minimum monetary amounts or
118. To sweep too broadly, going beyond what the actual factual and legal disputes require for
a decision, invites later characterization of the judicial decision as mere dicta, unworthy of sig-
nificant respect.
119. It is possible for a judicial precedent to be integrated later into relevant written laws, with
the benefit that the lawmakers can gauge the experience with the precedent, assuming enough
time has passed. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (holding that the burden rests on
one requesting discovery to show necessity of an attorney's work product); see also FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3) (incorporating the work-product guidelines set forth in Hickman).
120. The Rules Committee of the Illinois Supreme Court reviews all high court rules in areas
in which no other committee is specifically charged with rule review to facilitate the administra-
tion of justice. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. (3)(c)(2) (West 1998). Other committees may be appointed
to undertake review of a designated body of rules. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3(d)(1).
121. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3(a) (rulemaking procedures designed "to provide an opportunity
for comments and suggestions by the public, the bench, and the bar").
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other limitations. Implied authorization would embody language and/or
conduct directed by the party to her lawyer from which a reasonable
person could infer that the lawyer was authorized to strike the deal on
the client's behalf. Although not so described in Brewer II, Illinois case
law has often recognized these two forms of actual authority both in the
lawyer civil claim settlement authority context 122 and outside it.123 This
recognition in the lawyer settlement context arose despite the strong
suggestion in the Illinois Professional Conduct Rules that the client's
decision making power regarding civil claim settlement may not be
delegated to her lawyer. 124 As these two forms of settlement authority
(with others) now appear in the recently completed American Law
Institute ("ALI") formulations on the law governing lawyers, as in other
settings 125 the Illinois Supreme Court and other lawmakers should
employ the ALI pronouncements at least as starting points.
126
2. Burdens of Proof and Open Court Proceedings
The rebuttable presumption recognized in Brewer H for lawyers
involved in all "open court" proceedings should be eliminated. 127  As
noted earlier, Brooks v. Kearns stands as the most significant precedent
used by Brewer II to support this presumption; yet, the decision in
Brooks references in-court proceedings where an agreement was "made
a part of the decree of court."1 28 In Brewer H, the resignation issue,
which was at the heart of the dispute between Chester and Amtrak, was
never part of any in-court proceeding as defined in Brooks, because
Chester's resignation was not mentioned in the trial court dismissal
order. 129
122. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Clarke, 550 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
The First District concluded "that Rebecca's attorney had actual authority to negotiate a settle-
ment on her behalf. To the extent [the attorney] exceeded his express authority ... we find that
his authority was the logical, implied extension of his express authority." Id.
123. See, e.g., FDL Foods v. Kokesch Trucking, 599 N.E.2d 20, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
1992) (stating that an agent's "actual authority may be either express or implied").
124. ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1993) (stating that a "lawyer shall
abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter").
125. See, e.g., Nelson v. Hix, 522 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ill. 1998) (utilizing the RESTATEMENT
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 45 (1971)).
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 38 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, Mar. 29, 1996).
127. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing the rebuttable presumption in
"open court" proceedings).
128. Brooks v. Kearns, 86 111. 547, 551 (1877).
129. See Brewer 11, 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1333 (Ill. 1995), rev'g 628 N.E.2d 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1993).
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More germane to presumptions about lawyer civil claim settlement
authority than distinctions between open-court and out-of-court
proceedings, 130 or between recorded and unrecorded agreements, are
those based on distinctions between court proceedings at which each
party must appear personally, or appear through a representative with
actual settlement authority, and court proceedings where the presence of
those with actual settlement authority is not demanded. Recently, the
Indiana Supreme Court expressly recognized such a distinction.131
Presumption of lawyer settlement authority makes sense where the
adjudicatory body directs personal notice to the parties that it expects
them "to appear by settlement authorized representatives" 132 and where
the ensuing conference is attended only by lawyers. A presumption
here would be fair, with a "heavy burden" placed on those seeking to
rebut a presumption. 1
33
3. Apparent Authority
The apparent authority doctrine, unexplored in Brewer II, should be
recognized as applicable to lawyer settlement authority. This should
include a clear indication that apparent authority depends upon the
client's words or acts, including silence, 134 as reasonably viewed by
others especially an adverse party, and not upon the acts occurring
between the party/client and her lawyer, which, of course, implicate
actual authority, whether express or implied. Unfortunately, this
distinction is not always recognized. For instance, one Illinois court
ignored the distinction when it found that the lawyer's "apparent
130. Many jurisdictions, but not all, make such distinctions, but the rationales for them are
rarely explained. See Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1306 (Ind. 1998) (sug-
gesting the rationales involve the need to promote "the efficiency and finality of courtroom pro-
ceedings" and to avoid "stop and go disruption of the court's calendar").
131. See id. at 1301 (employing the phrase "inherent power," distinguished from actual or ap-
parent authority).
132. Id. at 1310 (noting that proceedings regulated by the ADR rules are properly character-
ized as court proceedings).
133. See id. at 1306 n.10 (citing Surety Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Williams, 729 F.2d 581, 582-83 (7th
Cir. 1984); Bradford Exch. v. Trein's Exch., 600 F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1979)). An attorney of
record is presumed to have client authority, but authority may be set aside by affirmative proof
that the attorney had no right to consent. See id.
134. See, e.g., Sakun v. Taffer, 643 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994). The Sa-
kun court stated, "[t]he authority of an agent may be presumed from the silence of the alleged
principal when he knowingly allows another to act for him as his agent... [w]here the principal
places an agent in a situation where he may be presumed to have authority to act for her, the prin-
cipal is estopped as against a third [party] from denying the agent's apparent authority." Id.
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authority" to settle was "the logical implied extension of his express
authority." '135
A good starting point providing a fresh look at a lawyer's apparent
authority to settle a civil claim is the following American Law Institute
statement:
A lawyer's act is considered to be that of the client in proceedings
before a tribunal or in dealings with a third person if the tribunal or
third person reasonably assumes that the lawyer is authorized to do the
act on the basis of the client's (and not the lawyer's) manifestations of
such authorization.136
Illinois courts have followed Institute pronouncements in other arenas.
The very recent ALl formulations on lawyer conduct seem better suited
to lawyer settlement work than do earlier, and more general, ALL
pronouncements on principal-agent relations.
4. Choice of Law
Although unexplored in Brewer H, there is a need for establishing
choice of law guidelines applicable to lawyer settlement authority issues
arising in civil actions in Illinois courts, in other adjudicatory or dispute
resolution facilitation bodies in Illinois, and in private
discussion/negotiation efforts involving the settlement of accrued or
foreseeable civil claims. A quest for certainty may prompt Illinois
lawmakers to establish that Illinois law always applies. This approach
may be compatible with Full Faith and Credit, 137 if not Supremacy
Clause, 138 principles because there are legitimate Illinois governmental
interests in the work of lawyers in Illinois. These interests include the
discussion/negotiation of civil claims, regardless of which government
is most directly related to the parties, their lawyers, and the substantive
laws applicable to the claims. Thus, even if in Brewer II, Chester, his
135. In re Marriage of Clarke, 550 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990) (finding
authority because the change was nominal and did not prejudice the party's custodial rights).
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 (Tentative Draft No. 5,
Mar. 29, 1996).
137. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1939) (stating that there is "little room" for the United States
Supreme Court under Full Faith and Credit principles to deny a state the authority to apply exclu-
sively its own law in its courts to "persons and events within the state").
138. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. As noted earlier, the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution demands the application of federal law to issues involving the release of a federal
law claim presented in a state court, especially where a uniform approach nationwide is desirable
and where the application of state law would too often defeat the purposes underlying the federal
law. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (quoting the United States Supreme Court
regarding the use of federal law in state courts to resolve federal questions).
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lawyer, Amtrak and its claims agent and lawyer were based outside of
Illinois, application of Illinois law to the civil claim settlement authority
issues may be appropriate as the relevant discussions/negotiations
occurred in Illinois. 139 Yet, Illinois law should not apply where, via a
retainer agreement or otherwise, the lawyer and client choose to employ
some other law should future disputes arise.
140
5. Required Writings
Although unexplored in Brewer II, and usually unrelated to lawyer
civil claim settlement authority, guidelines on required writings for civil
claim settlements should be considered. In fact, the factual disputes
arising in Brewer II over what was said during the settlement talks
demonstrate why writing requirements should be promulgated for many,
if not all, civil claim settlements. The Texas Civil Procedure Rule 11
provides a good starting point for a required writings standard deemed
applicable to civil claim settlements. 141 Rule 11 states:
Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between
attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless
it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record,
or unless it be made in open court and entered of record. 142
The rationale of this rule was recently described by the Texas high court
as follows:
Agreements of counsel, respecting the disposition of causes, which are
merely verbal, are very liable to be misconstrued or forgotten, and to
beget misunderstandings and controversies; and hence there is great
propriety in the rule which requires that all agreements of counsel
respecting their causes shall be in writing, and if not, the court will not
enforce them. They will then speak for themselves, and the court can
judge of their import, and proceed to act upon them with safety.
143
If the required writings rule is too broad, however, it can also create
problems. The "practical realities of modem trial practice" often make
139. Illinois lawmakers may determine that in some instances, the laws of other states may
apply to civil claim settlement authority issues arising during settlement talks in Illinois. See,
e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 8.5(b) (1993) (choice of law standard in Illi-
nois lawyer disciplinary proceedings indicates that at times the laws of other states should be em-
ployed).
140. See McAllister v. Smith, 17 Ill. 328, 33 (1856) (finding the chosen law will not apply
where "dangerous" or "immoral").
141. See Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Tex. 1984) (reviewing the history of Rule
11 and its rationales and with strong dissents as to its general applicability to all civil claim set-
tlement pacts).
142. Id. (quoting Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure).
143. Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995).
[Vol. 31
The Authority of Illinois Lawyers to Settle
the reduction of a "gentleman's agreement" to writing and signature
difficult, time consuming and inefficient, especially where an oral
agreement contains clear terms which are not likely to be in dispute.
144
Furthermore, special required writing norms may be appropriate for
settlements arising in particular contexts (e.g., mediation
proceedings)145 or for settlements involving particular claims (e.g.,
discrimination). 146
6. Compelled Party Attendance or Availability
Illinois lawmakers should consider some guidelines regarding
whether the discretionary powers over issues such as party attendance
or availability (as by telephone), may be judicially compelled at
settlement conferences in civil actions in the Illinois circuit courts. 14 7 In
Brewer II, Chester was in the courthouse when the alleged settlement
pact was reached, but was not himself present when the alleged deal
was struck, though he did talk thereafter to the trial court judge, who
was present when the alleged agreement had been entered earlier.
Unfortunately, in Illinois, an express civil procedure rule recognizing
these discretionary powers was removed in the 1995 amendment to
Supreme Court Rule 218(a). This removal, however, did not deprive
trial courts of their "inherent" powers to order attendance or
availability. 148 A newly promulgated recognition will not remove all
questions, 149 but will more likely prompt the development of significant
and accessible standards for judges and lawyers. A model for any
Illinois lawmaking initiative should be Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which expressly recognizes trial court discretion to
"require that a party or its representative.., be present or reasonably
144. Kennedy, 682 S.W.2d at 532 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
145. See, e.g., S. DIST. W. VA. L. R. CIV. P. 5.01(f) (settlements from mediation conferences
must be in "writing and signed by all parties to the agreement").
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(l)(A) (1994) (agreements waiving federal age discrimination
claims must be "written").
147. Compelling attendance or availability of those "with authority to settle" is not a mandate
that the person "must come to court willing to settle ... but only that they come to court in order
to consider the possibility of settlement." G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,
871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989).
148. See id. at 652 (stating that these powers enable trial courts "to preserve the efficiency,
and more importantly the integrity of the judicial process").
149. See In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1408 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding no discretion for trial
court to order attendance by employee of non-party insurer of the defendants).
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available by telephone in order to consider possible settlement of the
dispute."' 150
7. Judicial Enforcement
Finally, Illinois lawmakers should consider guidelines for Illinois
circuit court enforcement of civil case settlements. It seems clear that
civil case settlements which are incorporated into court orders, so that
duties are owed to the court as well as to adverse parties, are judicially
enforceable through varying forms of contempt proceedings.' 5 ' And, it
seems clear that civil case settlements resulting from talks outside the
courthouse (and thus not involving judicial officers) are not enforceable
through contempt proceedings where later voluntary dismissal requests
lead to court orders that neither contain the settlement terms nor retain
subject matter jurisdiction. In Brewer II, the initial dismissal order
incorporated one, but not all, of the settlement terms; the later disputed
term was not incorporated into the dismissal order. 52 Rather, the term
of the agreement actually incorporated was subject neither to a retention
of jurisdiction nor to a mandate to comply. Indeed, the dismissal order
only said that the trial court was "fully advised" of the term "in the
premises"; yet, the trial court was also fully advised in the premises of
the unincorporated term for judicial enforcement was sought.
Judicial enforcement of a civil case settlement generally should be
permitted only where trial court jurisdiction is retained in an order
accompanying voluntary dismissal. All the settlement terms, or at least
those terms for which possible enforcement is contemplated, should be
in a writing accompanying the dismissal. These terms may become a
portion of the dismissal order itself, or may be an agreement filed with
the trial court (perhaps under seal) that is separate from the dismissal
order.
V. CONCLUSION
The Illinois laws guiding lawyer civil claim settlement authority are
not well settled and should be reexamined to provide lawyers with clear
standards when they agree to a settlement on behalf of their clients. A
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c). On the standard governing judicial determinations to exercise
such powers, see G. Heileman Brewing Co., 871 F.2d at 653-54 (decision predating relevant Rule
16 amendment which relies upon inherent judicial power to compel availability or attendance).
151. See, e.g., People v. Warren, 671 N.E.2d 700, 710 (I1l. 1996) (distinguishing between civil
and criminal contempt in enforcement proceedings).
152. See Brewer 11, 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1333 (I11. 1995), rev'g 628 N.E.2d 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1993).
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comprehensive rulemaking initiative pursued by the Illinois Supreme
Court is the best vehicle to settle the principles of lawyer conduct. In
undertaking such an initiative, the Illinois Supreme Court should clarify
issues of actual authority, apparent authority, burdens of proof, and
open court presumptions. Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court
should address other laws directly impacting upon, but unrelated to,
lawyer settlement authority, including laws regarding choice of law,
separation of powers, required writings, compelled attendance and
judicial enforcement issues. The principles governing civil claim
settlements will become clear and settled only after such a
comprehensive revision is complete.
